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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
decided a pair of consolidated cases, Colorado v. United States Dep't
of Interior' and Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 2 in which suc-
cessful challenges were brought against the Department of Inte-
rior Type A and Type B regulations3 governing assessment of
natural resources damages under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or
Superfund).4 Because of the relatively short time that the regula-
tions have been in effect, there is a paucity of case law on the
1. 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
2. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
3. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-11.93 (1987).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1617 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). The Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) serves as the statutory authority mandating the promulgation of natural
2
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question of appropriate valuation methods for assessing damages
to natural resources caused by oil spills. 5 As the recent Alaskan
oil spill by Exxon demonstrates, the importance of correctly esti-
mating the monetary effects of oil spill damage to wildlife cannot
be stressed too highly. 6 The companion D.C. Circuit cases repre-
sent the first major challenge to the Department of Interior's in-
terpretation of the natural resource damage provisions of
CERCLA.7 Essentially, the court found that regulations limiting
natural resource damage assessments to the "lesser of" restora-
tion or replacement costs or lost use value of the resources were
not a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language and leg-
islative history of CERCLA's natural resource damage provi-
sions." Additionally, the court invalidated Type B regulations'
resource damage assessment regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c). Section
301 (c) (1) of CERCLA clearly states as follows:
The President, acting through Federal officials designated by the
National Contingency Plan published under section 9605 of this title,
... shall promulgate regulations for the assessment of damages for in-
jury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources resulting from a re-
lease of oil or a hazardous substance for the purposes of this chapter
and section 1321(f)(4) and (5) of Title 33.
42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1).
5. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980)
(oil tanker, owner, and insurance underwriter held liable for cleanup costs and
environmental harm from oil spill), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Burgess v.
M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977) (owners of Norwegian supertanker
held liable for government's cleanup costs associated with oil spill). Although
the Superfund legislation went into effect December 11, 1980, the Department
of Interior to whom the responsibility for formulating natural resource damage
regulations was delegated did not publish a final rule containing these assess-
ment provisions until August 1, 1986. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-11.93 (1987).
6. See, Two Environmental Groups Sue Exxon Seeking Better Cleanup, Restoration
Fund, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 744, 744-45 (Sept. 1, 1989) (discussing pending law-
suits against Exxon for recent Alaskan oil spill; Prince William Sound Conserva-
tion Alliance v. Exxon Corp., No. A89-095 (D.C. Alaska) and NWF v. Exxon
Corp., No. 3AN-89-6957 (Alaska Super. Ct.)); Alaska Sues Exxon, Pipeline Consor-
tium for Oil Spill Damages, Restoration Order, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 691 (Aug. 15,
1989) (discussing suit by state of Alaska against Exxon for Valdez incident;
Alaska v. Exxon Corp., No. 89-6852 (Alaska Super. Ct.)).
7. This is hardly surprising since the regulations themselves were only codi-
fied in the last two years. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-11.93 (1987). In Colorado v.
United States Dep't of Interior, state and environmental groups challenged the
validity of the Department of Interior's Type A rules for simplified assessments
of natural resource damages. 880 F.2d 481, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Ohio v.
United States Dep't of Interior was a parallel case in which state and environ-
mental groups, a chemical industry trade association, a manufacturer, and a pub-
lic utility company brought various challenges to the Department of Interior's
Type B rules governing the recovery of money damages for damage to natural
resources by releases of hazardous substances including oil spills. 880 F.2d 432,
438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
8. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 442 (D.C. Cir.
1989). The state and environmental parties argued that limiting recovery of
3
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hierarchy of methodologies for measuring lost use values which
focused exclusively on available market values before examining
other alternatives. 9
This Comment will first examine the historical background of
government recovery for natural resource damages through the
development of the common law1 0 and state legislation,' the
Clean Water Act' 2 and other federal legislation,13 and CER-
CLA.' 4 Next, this Comment will deal with a range of issues asso-
ciated with natural resource valuation, including a discussion of
different types of natural resource value (i.e., use value, existence
value, and intrinsic value).' 5 The tension between economic and
ecological views of natural resources will be examined in connec-
tion with a discussion of systemic values. 16 This will be followed
by a section delineating natural resource damage assessment
methods used to determine the extent of responsible party liabil-
damages to the "lesser of: restoration or replacement costs; or diminution of
use values" would too often result in insufficient funds available for restoring or
replacing the damaged resources to the equivalent state that existed before the
hazardous substance release or oil spill. Id. at 441 (quoting 43 C.F.R.
§ 11.35(b)(2) (1987)).
9. Id. at 464. The environmental groups in this case argued that the De-
partment of Interior regulations unreasonably focused on market value in deter-
mining the extent of natural resource damage recovery liability. Id. at 462.
10. At common law the states were permitted to recover for damages to
publicly held natural resources. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42
VAND. L. REV. 269, 277 (1989). This notion of the right of states to exercise
authority over their natural resources can be traced to United States Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' opinion in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., where he wrote "the state has an interest independent of and behind the
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word
as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants
shall breathe pure air." 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). For a discussion of the devel-
opment of the public trust doctrine, see Kenison, Buchholz, and Mulligan, State
Actions For Natural Resource Damages: Enforcement of the Public Trust, 17 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10434, 10435-36 (Nov. 1987); Carlson, Making CERCLA
Natural Damage Regulations Work: The Use of the Public Trust Doctrine and Other State
Remedies, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10299, 10302 (Aug. 1988).
11. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.758 (1987); CAL. HARB. & NAy. CODE
§ 293 (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.14 (West 1985); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 551 (1978); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2723 (McKin-
ney 1981). For a discussion of state Superfund legislation, see Comment, State
Hazardous Waste Superfunds and CERCLA: Conflict or Complement?, 13 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10348 (Nov. 1983).
12. Clean Water Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
13. E.g., Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1982);
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1982); Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1982).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675.
15. See Cross, supra note 10, at 280-97.
16. See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
4
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ity and the societal cost of lost resources.' 7 Following this sec-
tion, a brief discussion of economics and environmental
enforcement policy concerns will attempt to apply fundamental
economic cost/benefit analysis to liability assessment methods.' 8
This Comment will then examine the structure of CERCLA and
the Type A & B regulations to determine the appropriate factors
and methodologies for natural resource damage assessments.' 9
Finally, this Comment will analyze the approach of the D.C. Cir-
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). Section 107(a)(4) of CERCLA describes the lia-
bility of responsible parties to include as follows:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, de-
struction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study car-
ried out under section 9604(i).
The amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall include
interest on the amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through
(D).
Id.
Responsible parties are defined under section 107(a) of Superfund to in-
clude in pertinent part:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incinera-
tion vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance ....
Id. § 9607(a).
18. For an in-depth discussion of optimal enforcement policy, see Cohen,
Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent
Model with Moral Hazard, 30 J.L. & EcON. 23 (1987); see also, Grigalunas and
Opaluch, Assessing Liability for Damages Under CERCIA: A New Approach for Provid-
ing Incentives for Pollution Avoidance?, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 509 (1988).
19. For a discussion of the language and history of Superfund and the natu-
ral resource damage regulations, see Cross, supra note 10; Habicht, The Ex-
panding Role of Natural Resource Damage Claims Under Superfund, 7 VA. J. NAT.
RESOURCES L. 1 (1987); Note, Defining the Appropriate Scope of Superfund Natural
Resource Damage Claims: How Great an Expansion of Liability?, 5 VA. J. NAT. RE-
SOURCES L. 197, 217-19 (1985).
5
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cult Court of Appeals and attempt to discern the direction of the
application of Superfund natural damage assessments to the ex-
tent of the liability of responsible parties. 20
II. BACKGROUND
A. Common Law and State Legislation
Under traditional common law, states are permitted to re-
cover for damages to publicly held natural resources.2 1 Both case
law precedent 22 and state legislation 25 support the traditional
principle that state governments have a legitimate, enforceable
interest in public natural resources. One basis for state interven-
tion, though rarely invoked, is the doctrine of parens patriae au-
thority whereby the state gains the right to sue where no
individual state citizen has standing to bring a cause of action. 24
In effect, the state sues on behalf of the individual citizen as rep-
resentative of her interests. 25 Alternatively, the public trust doc-
trine is sometimes used to support state recovery of natural
resource damage claims on the theory that the government holds
public resources in trust for its citizens in a fiduciary relationship
for the public benefit.26
20. For a discussion of the approach of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,
see infra notes 170-226 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of common law state recovery, see Cross, supra note
10, at 278 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (Frankfurter, J,
concurring) (recognizing state's right to conserve or utilize its natural re-
sources); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896) (discussing the theory
of state ownership of wildlife within the state as a basis for regulation), overruled
by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979) (overruling theory of state
ownership of wildlife as basis for regulation and subjecting wildlife to same prin-
ciples of state regulation as applied to other natural resources).
23. Thirty-six states have enacted state superfund laws to deal with the
problem of hazardous substance releases. For a discussion and listing of state
superfund laws, see Comment, supra note 11, at 10352-60.
24. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972) (discussing
history of parens patriae authority) and cases cited therein; see also Cross, supra
note 10, at 278; Halter and Thomas, Recovery of Damages by States for Fish and
Wildlife Losses Caused by Pollution, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 5, 9-10 (1982).
25. 405 U.S. at 258 (1972). For a discussion of limitations onparenspatriae
authority, see Note, supra note 19, at 201-02 n.39. Cf. Hodas, Private Actions for
Public Nuisance: Common Law Citizen Suits for Relief from Environmental Harm, 16
ECOLOGY L.Q. 883 (1989) (private claims for public nuisance under common law
may sometimes be brought for natural resource damages).
26. For a discussion of the public trust doctrine in the context of natural
resource damages, see Carlson, supra note 10, at 10302; Kenison, Buchholz, and
Mulligan, supra note 10, at 10434-40; see also, Johnson, Water Pollution and the
Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENvrL. L. 485 (1989) (discussion of application of public
trust doctrine to nonpoint sources of water pollution). See generally, Wilkinson,
6
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State and common law remedies remain vital in the area of
recovery for natural resource damages since state laws governing
liability for hazardous substance releases are not preempted by
CERCLA. 27 This would seem to indicate that states have the op-
tion of suing under state or federal law. 28 Uncertainty may exist
in this area due to a line of cases holding that the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (now known as the Clean Water Act or
CWA) is the federal government's exclusive remedy for damages
to the water environment and collection of oil spill liability
costs. 29 Additionally, despite the continuing validity of state re-
covery actions, Superfund was enacted to provide a unifying stan-
dard for natural resource damage recovery in the midst of
diverging state approaches and as a response to congressional
dissatisfaction with state common law remedies.30 State statutory
approaches to natural resource damage assessments vary consid-
erably in terms of breadth of coverage, although most permit at
least some recovery of restoration costs for fish and wildlife.31
B. Clean Water Act and Other Federal Legislation
The Clean Water Act (CWA) is one of a variety of federal
The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Tradi-
tional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989) (analysis of development and fundamen-
tal legitimacy of public trust doctrine).
27. Superfund explicitly states that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be con-
strued or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional lia-
bility or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances within
such State." CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a).
28. See Cross, supra note 10, at 277; see generally, Funk, Federal and State
Superfunds: Cooperative Federalism or Federal Preemption, 16 ENvrL. L. 1 (1985);
Comment, supra note 11. But see CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1)
(prohibiting double recovery for natural resource damages under Superfund).
29. See generally, Duncan, Liability of Third Parties for Oil Spill Cleanup Costs
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Under General Maritime Law, 10
MAR. LAWYER 25 (1985); Guss, Interaction of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
with the Limitation of Liability Act and the General Maritime Law, 6 MAR. LAWYER 199
(1981); Comment, Cleanup Cost Liability for Oil Spills: Whether the FWPCA Precludes
Alternative Remedies for Recovery of Cleanup Expenses, 2J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 51
(1986); Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Is It Really an Exclusive Rem-
edy?, 21 WILLAMEarE L. REV. 107 (1985); Note, Federal Water Pollution Control
Act-The Exclusive Remedy for Recovery by the United States of Oil Spill Cleanup Costs-
United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 5 MAR. LAWYER 296 (1980); Comment, Federal
Water Pollution Control Act-The Federal Government's Exclusive Remedy for Recoupment
of Oil Spill Cleanup Costs, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1421 (1979).
30. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d at 455. The court of
appeals questioned the Department of Interior's reliance on the common law
standards in light of the legislative history of Superfund which clearly indicated
the inadequacy of the common law remedies. Id.
31. See Cross, supra note 10, at 278-79; Comment, supra note 11, at 10352-
1990] 497
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environmental statutes dealing with recovery for natural resource
damages.3 2 Other federal statutes include, inter alia, the Deepwa-
ter Port Act of 1974,33 the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA), 4 and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act.35
For the purposes of this Comment, the most important provision
of the Clean Water Act is section 311 which addresses liability for
the discharge of oil or hazardous substances into United States
navigable waters or near coastal shoreline.3 6 Liable parties under
the CWA include owners and operators of vessels or on-
shore/off-shore facilities that release oil with four narrowly con-
strued limited defenses for the following: act of God, act of war,
United States government negligence, and third party act or
omission.3 7 The other three federal acts mentioned above are
limited in coverage and lack specific provisions relating to appro-
priate methodologies for assessing natural resource damages.38
The text of the CWA, however, specifically designates the use of
restoration or replacement costs for natural resource damages.3 9
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1989). Oil and hazardous sub-
stance liability is provided for in section 311 of the Clean Water Act. Id. § 1321.
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1501-1524.
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1301-1356.
35. 43 U.S.C. § 1651-1655.
36. Section 311 of the Clean Water Act states as follows:
[The] owner or operator of any vessel from which oil or a hazardous
substance is discharged in violation of subsection (b)(3) of this section
shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law, be liable to the
United States Government for the actual costs incurred under subsec-
tion (c) of this section for the removal of such oil or substance by the
United States Government in an amount not to exceed, in the case of
an inland oil barge $125 per gross ton of such barge, or $125,000,
whichever is greater, and in the case of any other vessel, $150 per gross
ton of such vessel (or, for a vessel carrying oil or hazardous substances
as cargo, $250,000), whichever is greater, except that where the United
States can show that such discharge was the result of willful negligence
or willful misconduct within the privity and knowledge of the owner,
such owner or operator shall be liable to the United States Government
for the full amount of such costs.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1).
For an example of a pre-Superfund case finding liability for an oil spill, see
Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding owner of super-
tanker liable for government cleanup costs for oil spill).
37. CWA § 31 1(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f). Liability for owners or operators of
vessels, onshore facilities, and offshore facilities is provided for in subsections
(f)(1), (2), and (3), respectively, in virtually identical language subject to the
same four exceptions. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(f)(1), (2), & (3).
38. See Cross, supra note 10, at 277.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5). Section 311(f)(5) of CWA states that "[t]he
President, or the authorized representative of any State, shall act on the behalf
of the public as trustee of the natural resources to recover for the costs of replacing or
restoring such resources." 33 U.S.C. § 132 1(f)(5) (emphasis added).
8
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C. CERCLA
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA which provides for gov-
ernment recovery for almost any damage to natural resources on
government lands.40 Basically, Superfund operates as a two-step
process. First, designated officials assess natural resource dam-
ages.4' Second, if necessary, claims are brought against responsi-
ble parties42 as defined by section 107, subject to several limited
statutory defenses. 43
1. Section 107: Liability
Section 107 designates responsible parties from whom the
government can recover costs for "injury to, destruction of, or
loss of natural resources" from hazardous substance releases. 44
Liability damages include reasonable assessment costs as well as
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Section 107(f)(1) of CERCLA states as follows:
In the case of an injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources under subparagraph (C) of subsection (a) . . . liability shall be
to the United States Government and to any State for natural resources
within the State or belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or apper-
taining to such State ....
Id. § 9607(0(1).
41. CERCLA § 107(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2). Superfund provides for
assessment of natural resource damages by selected officials: "Such officials
shall assess damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources for
purposes of this chapter and such section 1321 of Title 33 for those resources
under their trusteeship .... " Id.
42. See supra note 17.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Section 107(b) of CERCIA provides for four stat-
utory exceptions to liability parallel to those in section 311 of the Clean Water
Act:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a
person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance
and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indi-
rectly, with the defendant ... if the defendant establishes by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to
the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the char-
acteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
Id. § 9607(b)(1)-(4).
44. CERCLA § 107(0(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
1990] 499
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actual damage to resources. 45 The statute provides that funds
collected from responsible parties must be made available for res-
toration or replacement of the damaged resources. 46 CERCIA
further indicates that "[t]he measure of damages... shall not be
limited by the sums which can be used to restore or replace such
resources."
47
2. Section 111: Uses of Superfund
Under section 111, CERCLA funds are available for natural
resource damage claims and federal assessments of damage. 48
Funds, however, are only available for expected restora-
tion/replacement costs pursuant to an approved agency recovery
plan. 49
45. For the text of section 107(a), see supra note 17. For cases dealing with
Superfund's liability standards, see, e.g., Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior,
880 F.2d 432, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding Department of Interior's in-
terpretation of Superfund's use of traditional causation standards for relating
substance releases and biological injuries); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1042 (2nd Cir. 1985) (upholding award of State's response costs
under section 107(a)(4)(A) for hazardous substance release).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1). Section 107(0(1) of CERCIA provides:
"[s]ums recovered.., under this subsection shall be retained by the trustee....
for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural re-
sources." Id.
47. Id. Section 107(0(1) of CERCLA also precludes the possibility of
double recovery for the same natural resource damages. "There shall be no
double recovery under this chapter for natural resource damages, including the
costs of damage assessment or restoration, rehabilitation, or acquisition for the
same release and natural resource." Id. See also, CERCLA § 114(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9614(b) (precluding compensated party from recovering under other State or
Federal law).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9611. Section lll(b)(l) of CERCLA provides as follows:
Claims asserted and compensable but unsatisfied under provisions
of section 1321 of Tide 33, which are modified by section 304 of this
Act may be asserted against the Fund under this subchapter; and other
claims resulting from a release or threat of release of a hazardous sub-
stance from a vessel or a facility may be asserted against the Fund
under this subchapter for injury to, or destruction or loss of, natural
resources, including cost for damage assessment ....
Id. § 9611(b)(1).
A list of enumerated uses of the Fund is set forth under section 111 (c) of
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(c)(1)-(6).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(i). Section 111(i) of CERCLA requires in pertinent
part:
Except in a situation requiring action to avoid an irreversible loss
of natural resources or to prevent or reduce any continuing danger to
natural resources or similar need for emergency action, funds may not
be used under this chapter for the restoration, rehabilitation, or re-
placement or acquisition of the equivalent of any natural resources un-
til a plan for the use of such funds for such purposes has been
developed and adopted by affected Federal agencies ....
[Vol. 1: p. 491
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3. Section 301: Damage Assessment Regulations
Section 301(c) requires the establishment of regulations for
natural resource damage assessment. 50 This responsibility was
delegated by the President to the Department of the Interior
which promulgated a two-tiered system of Type A and Type B
regulations.5" Type A regulations govern "standard procedures
for simplified assessments requiring minimal field observation, in-
cluding establishing measures of damages based on units of dis-
charge or release or units of affected area."52 The Department of
Interior has incorporated the use of a Natural Resource Damage
Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine Environments
(NRDAM/CME) in order to make the Type A assessments.5
Type B regulations cover "alternative protocols for con-
ducting assessments in individual cases to determine the type and
extent of short- and long-term injury, destruction, or loss" 54 in-
cluding on-site field inspection for major releases of hazardous
substances. 55 Section 301 requires the "best available" damage
assessment procedures, "including both direct and indirect in-
jury, destruction, or loss,"56 and provides that factors considered
in the assessment of damages should include "but [are] not lim-
ited to, replacement value, use value, and the ability of the ecosys-
tem or resource to recover." 57  Under Superfund, the
Department of Interior's assessments enjoy the status of rebutta-
ble presumption as measures of natural resource damages for lia-
50. 42 U.S.C. § 965 1(c)(1). Section 301(c) of CERCLA states as follows:
The President, acting through Federal officials ... shall study and
... shall promulgate regulations for the assessment of damages for in-
jury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources resulting from a re-
lease of oil or a hazardous substance for the purposes of this chapter
and section 1321(f)(4) and (5) of Title 33.
Id.
51. Id.
52. CERCLA § 301(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2)(A).
53. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.41 (1988) (general summary of the NRDAM/CME
computer model); Cross, supra note 10, at 323-26 (brief discussion of the
model); Grigalunas and Opaluch, supra note 18, at 518-28 (discussion of the
NRDAM/CME Type A assessments). See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying
text (discussing NRDAM/CME computer submodels).
54. CERCLA § 301(c)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2)(B).
55. 43 C.F.R. § 11.60 (1989). For detailed discussion of the D.C. Circuit's
approach to the Department of Interior's Type B rules for natural resource dam-
age assessment, see infra notes 183-226 and accompanying text.
56. CERCLA § 301(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2).
57. Id. See discussion infra note 164 and accompanying text.
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bility purposes. 58
III. NATURAL RESOURCE VALUATION
A. Value and Cost Contrasted
In the context of determining the worth of natural resources
it is necessary to distinguish value from cost as used in connection
with natural resource damages. Value denotes worth to society,
the qualitative and quantitative benefit to society of the natural
resources. 59 Cost is concerned with the expense of replacing or
restoring the damaged resources.60 Problems may arise since
value and cost measurements do not always or necessarily result
in the same amount of damages for a given natural resource.6 ' It
may be helpful to conceive of the value and cost of natural re-
sources as reflecting, respectively, ecological and economic per-
spectives on the inherent worth of natural resources. 62
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C). Section 107(f)(2)(C) of CERCLA provides
the following:
Any determination or assessment of damages to natural resources
for the purposes of this chapter and section 1321 of Title 33 made by a
Federal or State trustee in accordance with the regulations promul-
gated under section 9651(c) of this title shall have the force and effect
of a rebuttable presumption on behalf of the trustee in any administra-
tive or judicial proceeding under this chapter or section 1321 of Title
33.
Id.
59. See Note, supra note 19, at 204. Simply stated, value represents man's
judgement of the societal benefit associated with the use of natural resources. It
must be noted, however, that natural resource value is not limited to man's con-
sumptive uses of nature. "Our inquiry is about natural value of the kind met in
unlabored contexts, as in pure rather than applied science, in contemplative out-
door recreation rather than in industry, in ecology rather than in economics, in
thinking of nature as a source past its being a resource." H. ROLSTON, ENVIRON-
MENTAL ETHics, 201-02 (1988).
60. See Note, supra note 19, at 204. It may be helpful to think of cost simply
as what society must pay in order to get back the damaged resources or the
equivalent.
61. For a discussion of the relative merits of using cost or value measures
for assessments of natural resource damages, see Yang, Valuing Natural Resource
Damages: Economics for CERCL4 Lawyers, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10311,
10314-15 (Aug. 1984); see also Note, supra note 19, at 204.
62. For a discussion of the debate between environmental values and eco-
nomic cost efficiency, see Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U.
ILL. L. REV. 337, 337-60 (1986). Holmes Rolston III expresses the situation
quite eloquently: "Humans in culture will often capture and transform natural
values - organismic, specific, ecosystemic. This is both permissible and re-
quired, but it requires justification proportionately to value loss in the natural
world as this is traded for value gain in culture." ROLSTON, supra note 59, at 224.
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B. Market Value and Open Access Value Compared
Perhaps the most intuitively obvious method of determining
the worth of natural resources is to consider the lost market
value, i.e., the measure of the assessed damages to natural re-
sources based on market prices for the damaged commodity. 63
Market valuation includes such factors as lost profits, decreased
property values, decreased rental values of land, lost business op-
portunities, and replacement value." Because of the convenience
of performing this kind of economic analysis where market values
are readily ascertainable, the use of market values to approximate
the amount of natural resource damages is a very attractive
alternative. 65
At the other end of the spectrum in terms of ease of measure-
ment is the concept of open-access value. 66 Open-access value of
natural resources takes cognizance of the fact that not all damages
to natural resources are reflected as commodities in the open
market for goods.67 For example, though some endangered spe-
cies are not valued in the economic marketplace, our society has
determined that the continued existence of these forms of life
possesses a value of sufficient importance to warrant strong pro-
63. See Cross, supra note 10, at 302; Note, supra note 19, at 205. Market
value is generated by the allocation of resources through the competition (sup-
ply and demand) of buyers and sellers (utility-maximizing individuals and profit-
maximizing firms) who are assumed to act rationally in seeking optimal ex-
change conditions (prices). For a discussion of the market economy and the
difficulty in strictly applying the economic model to the evaluation of pollution
of natural resources, see Ross, OIL POLLUTnON AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM:
A STUDY OF PUGET SOUND AND THE STRAIT OF GEORGIA, 35-37 (1973). Public
goods, however, such as natural resources which are not privately owned, under-
cut the market economy rationale for assigning values to things since these
goods are normally not traded in the competitive exchange environment. See
also, Nance, Natural Resource Pricing Policies and the International Trading System, 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 65 (1989) (discussing issues associated with natural resource
pricing policies by national governments within international trading system).
64. See Note, supra note 19, at 205. Consider that in the context of govern-
ment requisitioning of private goods, market value has been limited to a non-
competitive market price. See, e.g., United States v. Commodities Trading Corp.,
339 U.S. 121 (1950) (denying claim for compensation for requisitioned goods
above ceiling price set by federal agency); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325
(1949) (limiting fair market value just compensation for requisitioned tug boat
to deny recovery of enhancement of value under federal statute).
65. See Cross, supra note 10, at 302.
66. See Note, supra note 19, at 205-07. Because a relevant market for the
particular damaged resource may not even exist, open-access value is extremely
difficult to quantify. Id. at 206.
67. Yang, supra note 61, at 10312; Halter and Thomas, supra note 24, at 18.
An example of open-access value is the existence of certain endangered species
which have no commercial uses for human purposes.
1990] 503
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tective measures.6
Several methods for approximating open-access resource val-
ues are available. 69 For example, money damages may be as-
sessed by computing the value of individual organisms in terms of
replacement cost per species individual.70 Fish value tables,
widely used at the state level, use values associated with growing
fish stocking programs. 71 Another alternative is the cost of re-
storing or rehabilitating the resource to its original undamaged
condition.7 2 Finally, ad hoc determinations on a case-by-case ba-
sis may be used to arrive at open-access values of natural re-
sources. 73 Because of the need to incorporate open-access values
into a model of natural resource values, lost market values alone
are insufficient.74
C. Three Different Types of Natural Resource Value
As discussed in the preceding subsection, valuation of natu-
ral resources is more complicated than it would appear at first
glance. More specifically, three distinct types of natural resource
value may be delineated for analysis: use value, existence value,
and intrinsic value. 75
1. Use Value
Simply defined, use value represents the worth of natural re-
sources associated with the instrumental application or material
consumption of resources in achieving practical individual and
68. The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
69. See Note, supra note 19, at 207.
70. See Halter and Thomas, supra note 24, at 19.
71. See Note, supra note 25, at 207-08; see, e.g., State Dep't of Pollution Con-
trol v. Int'l Paper Co., 329 So. 2d 5, 8 (Fla. 1976) (fish value tables authorized by
statute were relevant and proper to assessment of damages from effluent
discharge).
72. Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675 (1st Cir. 1980)
(primary standard for measurement of natural resource damages caused by oil
spill was reasonable cost for rehabilitating environment).
73. E.g., Parsons v. City of Sioux Falls, 272 N.W. 288, 292 (S.D. 1937) (im-
precise nature of damage from sewer discharge necessitated ad hoc determina-
tion by court in order to provide relief).
74. See Yang, supra note 61, at 10312. Since many natural resources are
necessarily common property of the citizenry at large, there is no market incen-
tive to trade in the resources in order to fix a market price. Id. Also, many
resources are indivisible and therefore not susceptible to precise valuation of
any particular portion of overall resources. Id.
75. See Cross, supra note 10, at 280-97. Cf ROLSTON, supra note 59, at 186-
88 (discussing instrumental value, intrinsic value, and systemic value).
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societal goals. 76 Traditionally, the reasons for relying upon value
as a natural resource damage measure stem from historical prece-
dent and economics. 77 Also, public use value underlies the state
parens patriae authority to recover for natural resource damages. 78
The strongest argument in favor of use value is that it is highly
relevant, more precise, and less speculative than other valuation
methods in that it serves as behavioral evidence of natural re-
source values by measuring the actual behavior of consumers in
purchasing the use of resources and not merely attitudinal
preferences. 79
Use value is, however, subject to certain limitations. Most
importantly, exclusive measurement of use value ignores the fact
that natural resources may have value beyond direct human uses
which cannot be captured in economic terms.8 0 User fees at na-
tional parks, for example, are not set in terms of what the market
76. Cross, supra note 10, at 281. Use value consists of both consumptive
and non-consumptive uses. Id. Consumptive uses are those uses of natural re-
sources such as fishing or hunting in which humans actually diminish the re-
sources in using them. Id. Non-consumptive uses differ in that humans use and
enjoy the resources without depleting them in any way such as, for example,
visiting national parks. Id.
77. Cross, supra note 10, at 282-83. A long tradition of United States law
supports the historical reliance on use values, in which the common law has up-
held state regulation of public natural resources using use values. Id. Propo-
nents of use value point to the fact that it serves as a measure of actual human
behavior and is therefore more reliable than non-behavioral measurements. Id.
at 282. Insofar as use value approximates market value for private resources,
market value reflects human freedom of choice in determining the worth of a
given resource. Id. Note, however, that the outcome of economic valuation of
resources is contingent on the underlying assumptions of human value which
lead to the conclusion that market prices most accurately represent the worth of
natural resources to humans. For example, the mere fact that in using a particu-
lar resource a certain market price is paid does not account for the possibility
that the human user of the resource might indeed be willing to pay a higher
price if the current market value were not the sole determinant of the value of
the use of the resource.
78. For a discussion ofparens patriae authority, see note 24 supra and accom-
panying text.
79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. But see, Saliba, Bush, Martin,
& Brown, Do Water Market Prices Appropriately Measure Water Values?, 27 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 617 (1987) (discussing possible distortions in market prices which do
not accurately reflect resource values). As applied to the Department of Inte-
rior's Natural Resource Damage Assessment regulations, the D.C. Circuit re-
cently recognized the limited relevance of market values in determining use
values. "While it is not irrational to look to market price as one factor in deter-
mining the use value of a resource, it is unreasonable to view market price as the
exclusive factor, or even the predominant one." Ohio v. United States Dep't of
Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
80. The major problem with use value is that it fails to take into account the
open-access value of natural resources. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying
text.
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will bear, but are in fact subsidized by the federal government in
order to attract people to come to enjoy the natural beauty en-
shrined in some of the few remaining wilderness areas.8' Indeed,
greater public use may diminish the use value of natural resources
through congestion, quality deterioration, and sub-optimal use.8 2
As a result, use value is a useful measure of natural resource
worth but fails to adequately express much of the value of natural
resources.
2. Existence Value
Existence value reflects the view that natural resources have
benefits beyond actual use value based merely on the existence of
the resources.8 3 Adoption of existence value policy is evidenced
in legislation such as the Endangered Species Act, s4 the Wilder-
ness Act of 1964, 85 and the Alaskan National Interests Lands
Conservation Act of 1980.86 Arguably, existence values should
be included in natural resource damage assessments because they
represent damages to resources not otherwise reflected in market
values for resources. Some studies suggest that existence values
81. 880 F.2d at 463. The D.C. Circuit opined that the rationale underlying
subsidization of entrance fees at national parks reflected a legislative acknowl-
edgement that "parks are priceless national treasures" which should be made
available to all regardless of one's economic status. Id.
82. Cross, supra note 10, at 284.
83. Cross, supra note 10, at 285. Existence values may be subdivided into
constituent subparts as follows: option value, vicarious value, and intertemporal
value. Id. Option value takes into account the option of future use, i.e., that
humans not currently using the resource may desire to use it someday. Id. The
quantifiable nature of an option value can be shown by analogy to commodities
options which are acknowledged to have demonstrable economic value although
the goods are not presently being consumed. Id. at 286. Vicarious value is
slightly different in that preservation is valued, not for future use, but for the
value of knowing that the resources are there. Id. In other words, merely be-
cause an individual does not personally use the particular resource does not
mean that the individual does not value its continued existence. Id. at 287. In-
tertemporal value reflects the worth of bequeathing natural resources to future
generations. Id. at 288. In this way, wasteful current consumption can be
viewed as reducing the overall value of natural resources presently and in the
future.
84. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
85. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988). The Act set up federally owned wilder-
ness areas "where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man,
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain." Id. § 1131(c).
86. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1988). The Act's purpose is to "preserve for
the benefit, use, education, and inspiration of present and future generations
certain lands and waters in the State of Alaska that contain nationally significant
natural, scenic, historic, archaeological, geological, scientific, wilderness, cul-
tural, recreational, and wildlife values." Id. § 3101(a).
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may yield higher assessments than use values.8 7
Despite the efficacy of existence values in encapsulating fac-
ets of natural resource value beyond use values, there are several
problems associated with existence values. First, the lack of good
behavioral tests for existence value reflects the difficulty in quanti-
fying values that are attitudinal and not behavioral.88 Second, the
use of anthropocentric valuation for use and existence values em-
bodies the "criminal conceit that nature is primarily a source of
raw materials and energy for human purposes. '8 9 Finally, since
87. Cross, supra note 10, at 289.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 290 (quoting H. ROLSTON, PHILOSOPHY GONE WILD: ESSAYS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHics 22 (1986)). Systems theory provides a healthy response
to challenges to Man's view that the world is centered around his existence.
"Seeing himself as a connecting link in a complex natural hierarchy cancels
man's anthropocentrism, but seeing the hierarchy itself as an expression of self-
ordering and self-creating nature bolsters his self-esteem and encourages his
humanism." LASZLO, THE SYSTEMS VIEW OF THE WORLD, 118 (1972).
Several environmentalists have taken the challenge to anthropocentrist val-
uation even further. One commentator writes as follows:
[The legal system has reflected the general view that wildlife are an
economic resource that is worth protecting only to assure society that
the "free" resource would always be available for exploitation. It was
presumed that the only interest reflected in the legal system was a
human one and that all values were derived from calculations concern-
ing usefulness to humans. It is now time to recognize that wildlife have
their own interests and that they should have equal access to the legal
system to protect and promote those interests.
Favre, Wildlife Rights: The Ever-Widening Circle, 9 ENVTL. L. 241, 259 (1979).
Christopher Stone provided a strong argument for the legal rights of natural
objects in his famous Trees article. See Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward
Legal Rights For Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972). Indeed, Justice
Brennan approved the Trees argument in his dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton
where he stated the following:
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also
put neatly into focus if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environ-
mental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in
the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or
invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of pub-
lic outrage. Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's eco-
logical equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon
environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.
405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
But see Elder, Legal Rights for Nature-The Wrong Answer to the Right(s) Question,
22 OsGooDE HALL L.J. 285 (1984). For an example of an unusual case confer-
ring standing to sue on an endangered species, see, e.g., Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of
Land and Nat. Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (action for declaratory
and injunctive relief brought on behalf of rare bird under Endangered Species
Act).
Aldo Leopold, the seminal environmental thinker, described the conflicting
views of industry and environmentalists in colorful terms. "In all of these cleav-
ages, we see repeated the same basic paradoxes: man the conqueror versus man
the biotic citizen; science the sharpener of his sword versus science the search-
1990] 507
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existence values depend on public attitudes about natural re-
sources, the very application of existence values provides an in-
centive to keep the public ignorant of natural resources, resulting
in lower existence and use values.9°
3. Intrinsic Value
Intrinsic value goes beyond use or existence values to con-
sider the needs and wants of nature itself.9 1 The strongest propo-
nents of intrinsic value may be found in the "deep ecology"
movement which supports the view that all living things have in-
herent value and independent moral significance apart from
human existence. 92 Resistance to the adoption of intrinsic values
light on his universe; land the slave and servant versus land the collective organ-
ism." A. LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC 238 (1966).
90. Cross, supra note 10, at 291. This argument supposes that efforts to
reduce possible liability for damages to natural resources may lead to a strong
interest, on the part of potential environmental despoilers, in keeping the public
ignorant or at least minimally aware of resource uses and the existence and im-
portance of certain endangered species. Id. For a classic discussion of the ethical
dangers of this approach, see Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundationsfor Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). Professor Tribe pro-
vides a strong appeal to our "ethical impulse toward nature" which he believes
is violated "when we use 'nature surrogates' (i.e., plastic trees) to conceal the
wounds we inflict on the natural order, thereby anesthetizing our aesthetic and
ecological sensibilities." Id. at 1347.
91. See Cross, supra note 10, at 292-93. Intrinsic value is part of a holistic
view which considers the totality of living systems in the valuation process of
individual resources. "Every intrinsic value has leading and trailing ends point-
ing to value from which it comes and toward which it moves.... Intrinsic value
is a part in a whole, not to be fragmented by valuing it in isolation." H. ROLSTON,
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHics, 217 (1988). Current scientific thinking is consonant
with the recognition of intrinsic value, as evidenced by the emergence of the
Gaia theory of the biosphere as a "self-regulating entity with the capacity to keep
our planet healthy by controlling the chemical and physical environment." J.E.
LOVELOCK, GAIA: A NEW LOOK AT LIFE ON EARTH, ix (1979).
92. Elder, supra note 89, at 286. Deep ecologists follow a deconstructionist
model which "treat[s] environmental problems as symptoms of a much deeper
problem in the relationship between people and nature... question[ing] the
very premises of modern society and call[ing] for major transformations in val-
ues and forms of social organization." Pollack, Reimagining NEPA: Choices for En-
vironmentalists, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 401 (1985). Despite the
philosophical complexity of deep or deconstructionist ecology, in 1949 Aldo Le-
opold summarized the ethic quite succinctly: "A Thing is right when it tends to
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong
when it tends otherwise." A. LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC 240 (1966)
(quoted in Pollack, Reimagining NEPA: Choices for Environmentalists, 9 I-RV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 401 (1985)). Leopold anticipated criticisms about the lack
of economic value of some natural resources:
One basic weakness in a conservation system based wholly on economic
motives is that most members of the land community have no eco-
nomic value .... Of the 22,000 higher plants and animals native to
Wisconsin, it is doubtful whether more than 5 per cent can be sold, fed,
18
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for natural resources can be found in mainstream philosophical
traditions.93 Even so, recognition of the relevance of intrinsic
value is evidenced by the policy of the Endangered Species Act
which seeks to promote the continued existence of embattled
forms of wildlife regardless of human consumptive concerns.9
Another example of the relevance of intrinsic value is the ecologi-
cal concern that continued defoliation of South American rain
forests and loss of trees through drought, fire, and cutting for
timber without replacement may adversely affect the balance of
ecosystems. 95
eaten, or otherwise put to economic use. Yet these creatures are mem-
bers of the biotic community, and if (as I believe) its stability depends
on its integrity, they are entitled to continuance.
LEOPOLD, supra note 89, at 225.
Note, however, that economists might become skeptical if ecologists
ascribed overly-inflated values to so-called "worthless" resources.
93. For a discussion of philosophical opponents of intrinsic value applied to
natural resources, see Cross, supra, note 10, at 294-95. Philosophers sharing the
view of nature created primarily for the needs of man include such notables as:
Aristotle, Bacon, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Kant. Id. See also,
M'Gonigle, The Tribune and the Tribe: Toward A Natural Law of the Market/Legal
State, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1986) (in-depth analysis of development of compet-
ing philosophical paradigms in context of environmental issues).
94. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988). Section
1531 (b) states that the purposes of the Act are "to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may
be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered
species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate."
Id. § 1531(b). For an example of a case demonstrating the high priority ac-
corded by Congress to the Endangered Species Act, see, e.g., Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (protection of snail darter under Endan-
gered Species Act prohibits impoundment of habitat by dam project).
95. The destruction of huge rain forests reduces the amount of oxygen pro-
duced and released into the air through photosynthesis, thus disturbing the oxy-
gen-content of the atmosphere which may eventually adversely affect Man.
Barry Commoner eloquently expressed the delicate balance maintained within
ecosystems thusly:
The amount of stress which an ecosystem can absorb before it is
driven to collapse is also a result of its various interconnections and
their relative speeds of response. The more complex the ecosystem,
the more successfully it can resist stress .... Like a net, in which each
knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist
collapse better than a simple unbranched circle of threads - which if
cut anywhere breaks down as a whole. Environmental pollution is often
a sign that ecological links have been cut and that the ecosystem has
been artificially simplified.
C.W. MORSE, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTATION, 23-24 (1984) (quoting B. CoM-
MONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE, 38 (1972)).
As developed by the American physiologist Walter Cannon, the term "ho-
meostasis" may be conveniently understood as "[t]he maintenance of relatively
constant conditions by active control."J.E. LOVELOCK, supra note 91, at 11. For
a discussion of the relation of ecological homeostasis to natural resource dam-
ages, see Cross, supra note 10, at 332-34. For a general discussion of ecological
19
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As a practical matter, a methodological problem may arise
because some "deep ecologists" loathe to assign monetary values
to natural resources, so not surprisingly, intrinsic values are diffi-
cult to quantify. 96 Furthermore, intrinsic values suffer from a lack
of popular support due to the prevailing view of Man's dominion
over Nature and the role of enlightened human preference in val-
uing natural resources. 97
D. Anthropocentric and Biocentric Valuation
The three types of natural resource value which have been
discussed so far (use value, existence value, and intrinsic value)
can be understood as occupying relative positions on a contin-
uum between anthropocentric and biocentric valuation.98
ANTHROPOCENTRIC-BIOCENTRIC CONTINUUM
MAN NATURE
use value - - existence value - - intrinsic value
economics shallow ecology deep ecology
At the risk of oversimplification, the anthropocentric preference
for use values is generally the economist's view9 and the biocen-
tric preference for recognition of natural resource intrinsic value
is essentially the ecologist's view. 100 The roots of the anthropo-
homeostasis and the interconnectedness of various members of the biotic com-
munity, see LEOPOLD, supra note 89, at 230-36.
96. Cross, supra note 10, at 293-94.
97. See Cross, supra, note 10, at 295-96. Dissatisfaction with the existing
state of affairs and what they perceive to be the collective apathy of the masses
has led the deep ecologists to "reject the ethic of individualistic self governance
in favor of one reflecting the interconnectedness between people and between
people and nature." Pollack, supra note 92, at 410.
98. For a discussion of an alternative ethical paradigm for the environment,
see Callicott, Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics, 21 AM.
PHIL. Q. 299 (1984) (study of non-anthropocentric value theory expands recog-
nition of intrinsic value to non-human beings).
99. For a humorous treatment of economic analysis and economists, see
Leijonhufvud, Life Among the Econ, 11 W. ECON. J. 327 (1973) (facetious anthro-
pological study of "culture" of economists).
100. See Devall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299 (1980)
(distinguishing two distinct versions of environmentalism in contrast to domi-
nant social paradigm favoring economic growth over ecological concerns);
Naess, The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary, 16 IN-
QUIRV 95 (1973) (seminal work on anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric
ecology focusing on characteristics of deep ecology movement); see also, Karp,
Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic: Is An Ecological Conscience Evolving In Land Development
Law?, 19 ENVTL. L. 737, 739 (1989) (tracing development of shallow and deep
ecology from views of Pinchot and Muir, respectively). Shallow ecologists or
reformist environmentalists are concerned with pollution prevention and re-
source depletion because of the threat to human interests. Devall, supra, at 302;
20
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centric view can be found in the mainstream Western philosophi-
cal tradition.' 0 '
The emerging biocentric view may represent a paradigmatic
shift in contemporary understanding of Man's place in the Earth's
ecology.' 02 The difference in the two views is one of dialectical
Karp, supra, at 739; Naess, supra, at 95. See, e.g., Carlson, NEPA and the Conserva-
tion of Biological Diversity, 19 ENrL. L. 15, 19 (1988) (stressing that organisms
without instrumental use value "play roles in ecological systems that are essen-
tial to civilization"). Deep ecologists believe in recognizing the intrinsic value of
natural resources and ecosystems apart from man's existence. Karp, supra, at
739.
Devall cites a number of sources of the deep ecology movement: Eastern
spiritual traditions, Native American traditions, "minority tradition" of Western
religion and philosophy, science of ecology, and naturalist artists. Devall, supra,
at 304-08. The distinctive feature of the deep ecology movement is the
ecophilosophical emphasis on transforming normative values and current forms
of social organization. See Id. at 303; Naess, supra, at 98-99.
101. See ROLSTON, supra note 91, at 45 (traditional philosophies of Aristotle
and Bentham support view that nature's purpose is service of human needs).
Different sources of the dominant anthropocentric social paradigm are variously
believed to include the Judeo-Christian tradition, excesses of capitalism and in-
dustrial progress and archaic Lockean notions of "property," and Western tech-
nological "scientism." Devall, supra note 100, at 301. In fact the traditional view
of human dominion over nature can be traced to sources as diverse as the Book
of Genesis, the writings of Immanuel Kant, and modem philosophers and scien-
tists such as Michael Polanyi (philosopher of science), G.G. Simpson (anthropol-
ogist), and W.H. Murdy (biologist). ROLSTON, supra note 91, at 62-63.
Even so, the philosophy of David Hume provides a strong argument that
anthropocentric valuation is inherently subjective since it depends on human
sentiments concerning value, grounded in human feelings. Callicott, supra note
98, at 305. The Humean subjectivist approach to moral psychology was adopted
by Charles Darwin in the theory of biological evolution and Aldo Leopold's
evolving land ethic. Id. at 304-05. This cognitive thread leads to a position of
non-anthropocentric humanism which recognizes the intrinsic value of plants
and animals from the perspective of human value judgements. Id. at 305.
Rolston expands on the unique and superior position of Man within the
biospheric realm, recognizing the necessity of human activity for the smooth
functioning of the ecosystem itself. ROLSTON, supra note 91, at 72-73. "All value
does not 'center' on humans, though some of it does.... Nevertheless, humans
are of the utmost value in the sense that they are the ecosystem's most sophisti-
cated product. They have the highest per capita intrinsic value bf any life form
supported by the system." Id. at 73; see also, Halligan, The Environmental Policy of
Saint Thomas Aquinas, 19 ENrrL. L. 767, 780 (1989) (asserting Thomistic belief in
unique higher status of human beings over animals and plants in God's
creation).
102. For example, modem science has not seen definitive proof of the "an-
thropic" explanation for the evolution of the universe. See, e.g., Carr and Rees,
The Anthropic Principle and the Structure of the Physical World, 278 NATURE 605, 612
(1979). For a discussion of Thomas Kuhn's model of the shifting of scientific
paradigms, see Devall, supra note 100, at 301-02.
See Callicott, supra note 98, at 300 (environmental ethics represents paradig-
matic shift in contemporary moral philosophy). Non-anthropocentric philo-
sophical ethical systems include the "animal liberation" movement, classic
utilitarian ethical hedonism (exemplified by expansion of Bentham's hedonic
calculus to include pain and pleasure of animals), and biocentric ethical conativ-
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valuation through objectification of nature from a human subjec-
tivist perspective versus holistic integrative valuation by participa-
tion in nature.'0 3 In some ways the two views parallel the
distinction between the traditional dualistic cause and effect
model and the current unified field theory of interrelatedness of
cause-effect as an event.10l
E. Ecological Economics: Systemic Values
Although the dialectical model of natural resource values on
the continuum between anthropocentrism and biocentrism ex-
plains the tension between the economic and ecological positions,
a third alternative is a systemic view that integrates both perspec-
tives within a hierarchical model.10 5 Systemic values necessarily
ism (as represented by the Schweitzerian reverence-for-life ethic). Id. at 300-02.
For a discussion of non-economic based laws and cases incorporating a greater
emphasis on biocentric concerns, see Karp, supra note 100, at 747-55.
103. See ROLSTON, supra note 91, at 203-08 (presenting model contrasting
traditional dialectical and ecological participative value perspectives).
104. Id. (ecological valuation reflects holistic view of observer/valuer par-
ticipating within natural field during valuation process in contrast to traditional
self-reflective dualistic view). Deep ecology rejects the subject-object model in
favor of a relational, unified-field model which conceives of "organisms as knots
in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations .. " The model holds that
the "intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such "that the relation
belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of A and B, so that without the
relation, A and B are no longer the same thing." Naess, supra note 100, at 95.
For a lengthy discussion of similarities between Eastern spiritual traditions
and the new scientific paradigm of theoretical physics, see F. CAPRA, THE TAO OF
PHYsIcs, (1975).
105. The dialectical interaction between dual structures, in this case eco-
nomic and ecological valuation criteria, can be transformed into a cooperative
integrated process through a triadic structure of economic, ecological, and sys-
temic values. The necessity of a third element or catalytic agent within a closed
(valuation) system finds support in the work of Claude Levi-Strauss:
Concentric dualism is a mediator between diametric dualism and triad-
ism, since it is through the agency of the former that the transition
takes place between the other two.... There is thus a profound differ-
ence between diametric and concentric dualism. Diametric dualism is
static, that is, it cannot transcend its own limitations .... But concen-
tric dualism is dynamic and contains an implicit triadism.
C. LEvI-STRAuss, STRUcTuRAL ANTHROPOLOGY, 151 (1963).
The systemic view is the result of attempts to find a complete biological
model of the biosphere analogous to the search for a TOE (theory of everything)
in theoretical physics. See Callicott, supra note 98, at 303 (rational holistic model
of biosphere containing "biomes, biocoenoses, and micro-ecosystems, species
and their populations"). Several theoretical models have been proposed by di-
verse individuals. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, FISHERMAN's GUIDE: A SYsrEMs AP-
PROACH TO CREATIVITY AND ORGANIZATION, 217, fig. 35 (1985) (petroleum
engineer's integrative theoretical model for hierarchies inherent within bio-
sphere and without relation to cosmological phenomena); LOVELOCK, supra note
91 (presenting Gaia hypothesis of Earth as integrated living system); ROLSTON,
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recognize human subjective values and objective biological values
of natural resources.106 Intrinsic values are interwoven into in-
strumental relationships as part of an integrated system of inter-
dependent parts within a structural whole.10 7 Essentially, the
challenge is to expand the economists' concept of economic value
of natural resources while contracting the ecologists' concern for
nature within limits which ensure the healthy continuation of the
ecosystem. 108
One of the emerging ethical paradigms for environmentalists
is Rene Dubos' concept of human stewardship over natural re-
sources. 0 9 The direction of recognition of systemic values may
range from Thomistic theocentrism to the deep ecologists' recog-
nition of the long-range impact of present environmental deci-
sions on the continued well-being of Mother Earth.' 10
IV. NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
METHODS
For the purposes of this Comment, four different types of
natural resource damage assessment methods will be discussed:
restoration and replacement costs, market valuation, behavioral
supra note 91, at 216, fig. 6.6 (hierarchical model of intrinsic, instrumental, and
systemic value in projective nature).
106. See ROLSTON, supra note 91, at 190-91. Rolston compares the objectiv-
ity of the systemic view with the inherent subjectivity of anthropocentric valua-
tion. Id. at 190. See supra note 101 (concerning Humean view of inherent
subjectivity of human value judgments).
107. ROLSTON, supra note 91, at 187-88. Rolston rather eloquently ex-
presses the interrelationship of instrumental and intrinsic values:
Intrinsic value exists embedded in instrumental value. No organism is
a mere instrument, for each has its integral intrinsic value. But each
can also be sacrificed in behalf of another life course; then its intrinsic
value collapses, becomes extinct, and is in part instrumentally trans-
ported to another organism.
Id. at 222.
108. See Karp, supra note 100, at 743 (Leopold's land ethic necessitates de-
cision-making expanded beyond economics to include aesthetics and environ-
mental ecological ethics). Rolston makes the point that differences in
metaphysics between various religious and philosophical views need not impede
agreement on an environmental ethics of suitable responsible human behavior.
ROLSTON, supra note 91, at 230.
109. See LOVELOCK, supra note 91, at 123. "There is, for example, a fresh
awareness of the concept of Christian stewardship, whereby man, while still al-
lowed dominion over the fish and the fowl and every living thing, is accountable
to God for the good management of the Earth." Id. at 145.
110. See Halligan, supra note 101 (discussion of Thomistic environmental
policy). Cf. Devall, supra note 100 (discussion of deep ecology movement);
Naess, supra note 100 (seminal article on deep ecology).
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use valuation, and contingent valuation.' In passing it should
be noted that a separate set of issues is associated with the appro-
priate time to conduct natural resource damage procedures." 2
A. Restoration and Replacement Costs
Although at first glance restoration and replacement costs
may appear to be equivalent measurement techniques, on closer
examination these methods are distinguishable. Restoration
costs attempt to determine the economic expense of returning
the damaged natural resource to its former, undamaged condi-
tion.113 Replacement costs, on the other hand, represent the eco-
nomic expense of acquiring other equivalent resources to
substitute for the lost resources." 14
Restoration and replacement costs share certain attributes
that justify considering them together." 5 Most importantly, res-
111. See Cross, supra note 10, at 297. Of these four assessment methodolo-
gies, market valuation and behavioral use valuation correlate with measurement
of use values as discussed supra at notes 76-82 and accompanying text. Restora-
tion and replacement costs, on the other hand may take into account existence
values of natural resources as discussed supra at notes 83-90 and accompanying
text.
112. For a discussion of the timing of natural resource damage assessment
procedures, see Note, supra note 19 at 209-15 and accompanying text. See also,
Yang, supra note 61 at 10311, 10313-14. The issues concern the appropriate-
ness of damage assessments at the point of discharge, the resource level, or at
the user level.
113. Cross, supra note 10, at 298; Yang, supra note 61 at 10315. For a dis-
cussion of the estimation of restoration costs, see Breen, CERCI's Natural Re-
source Damage Provisions: What Do We Know So Far?, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10304, 10310 (1984). Compare the application of restoration cost meas-
ures for common law property damage, see, e.g., Trinity Church v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 399 Mass. 43, 50, 502 N.E.2d 532, 536 (1987) (restoration
cost appropriate measure for excavation damage to church building); Weld
County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1317 (Colo. 1986) (use of
restoration costs within court's discretion for negligence and trespass property
damages).
114. Yang, supra note 61, at 10314; see also, Cross, supra note 10, at 301-02.
An example of the use of replacement values would be the use of fish value
tables in determining the cost of replacing the damaged wildlife in the water
environment. Yang, supra note 61, at 10314. For an example of the use of re-
placement costs in an action involving damage to natural resources, see United
States v. Board of Trustees of Fla. Keys Comm. College, 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.
Fla. 1981) (finding that replacement of damaged resources through alternate
site mitigation project was viable alternative to requiring assessment of restora-
tion costs on injuring party); But see, Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628
F.2d 652, 677 (1st Cir. 1980) (striking down award of over five million dollars
for replacement of destroyed animals with no commercial value when such ani-
mals would replace themselves in natural course of events).
115. For example, both restoration and replacement cost methods affect
the supply side of the equation of natural resource uses to the exclusion of the
demand side considerations captured by use values.
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toration and replacement costs are widely agreed upon, serving as
the presumptive damage measure under the Clean Water Act pro-
visions.' 16 Restoration and replacement costs are often easily de-
terminable, although at times extremely expensive, even greatly
exceeding the value of the natural resources under another valua-
tion technique." 17 A distinction between restoration and replace-
ment costs can be seen in the effect of each method on the
different types of natural resource value discussed in the previous
section. 1'8
B. Market Valuation
Commercial industry strongly favors market valuation as an
assessment method for natural resource damages. 19 The market
valuation method uses such indicia as market prices for resources
where available, considering reduction in land or property values
as assessment criteria.' 20
Market valuation possesses a number of advantageous fea-
tures as a natural resource damage assessment method. First, as a
116. Cross, supra note 10, at 298. Section 311(0(4) of the Clean Water Act
provides as follows:
The costs of removal of oil or a hazardous substance for which the
owner or operator of a vessel or onshore or offshore facility is liable
under subsection (0 of this section shall include any costs or expenses
incurred by the Federal Government or any State government in the
restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed as a re-
sult of a discharge of oil or a hazardous substance in violation of sub-
section (b) of this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(4) (emphasis added).
117. See Cross, supra note 10, at 298. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe
Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675 (1st Cir. 1980) (dicta recognizing possibility that
restoration may be unreasonable remedy if "either physically impossible or...
disproportionately expensive").
118. Cross, supra note 10, at 298-302. Effective restoration of damaged re-
sources may cure impaired use value, existence value, and intrinsic value by re-
turning the environment to the status quo ante. Id. at 298. Replacement of
damaged natural resources, however, may protect lost use value, though not lost
existence and intrinsic values, since new resources have been substituted for the
injured resources. Id. at 302.
119. Cross, supra note 10, at 302. This is hardly surprising insofar as limit-
ing natural resources damages to the market cost of the damaged resources al-
lows firms to engage in cost-benefit analysis planning in determining marginal
costs of increasing levels of safety expenditures. For a discussion of economic
cost-benefit and marginal cost analysis, see infra notes 145-51 and accompanying
text.
120. Cross, supra note 10, at 302. See, e.g., 880 F.2d at 442 (calculating hy-
pothetical lost use value of seals and seabird habitat using market prices of fur
pelts plus selling price per acre of spoiled land). See also, 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1)
& (2) (1989) (providing for market price and appraisal methodologies for dam-
ages to marketed resources).
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practical matter, * market values are usually easily measurable. 21
Second, market values contain an indicia of reliability as a damage
measure since they reflect actual behavior of buyers and sellers in
the marketplace.' 22 Third, insofar as market valuation increases
societal benefit through accurate representation of societal costs
associated with natural resource damage, this method is economi-
cally efficient. 123
Despite the aforementioned advantages of market valuation
methods, a number of disadvantages are associated with the de-
pendence on market prices to represent natural resource dam-
ages. First, the common law does not compel market valuation of
natural resources damages. 124 Second, although market value
may overstate true natural resource damage, it is more likely to
understate true natural resource damage.' 25 Third, market value
generally fails to reflect existence or intrinsic values of natural re-
121. Cross, supra note 10, at 303. Market prices for resources that are
traded in a market economy should be readily ascertainable for the purpose of
assessing damages to those resources. The market price can be determined by
examining current market sale prices. But see, 880 F.2d at 463 (quoting United
States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) that market
prices are inappropriate value measures "when the market value has been too
difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest injustice to
owner or public"); see also, Ross, supra note 63 (difficulty of assessing economic
impact of natural resource damages).
122. Cross, supra note 10, at 303. This feature of market valuation, which
reflects the values ascribed to the resource by actual market transactions trading
in the resource provides an objective measurable standard by which to judge the
value of the damaged resources. Cf. 880 F.2d at 475 (contingent valuation meth-
odology utilizes subjective "individually-expressed values for different levels of
quality of resources, and dollar values of individuals' changes in well-being").
123. Cross, supra note 10, at 304. The economic principle of the Law of
Supply and Demand governs the determination of prices for various goods avail-
able in a free market economy. Economists argue that societal benefit is maxi-
mized through the competition of buyers and sellers in reaching an equilibrium
point where supply and demand for the market good are equalized at an eco-
nomically efficient price. Consequently, the use of market valuation results in
consistency between valuations of public and private natural resources. See
Cross, supra note 10, at 304-05.
124. Cross, supra note 10, at 305. See also, Anderson, Natural Resource Dam-
ages, Superfund, and the Courts, 16 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 405, 449-50 (1989)
(Superfund's natural resource damage provisions expand common law damage
recovery approach).
125. Cross, supra note 10, at 307. Overstated damages might occur in situa-
tions where the market prices for the resource are highly inflated and bear no
relation to the true value of the resource. Speculative frenzies such as the tulip
bulb craze in Holland constitute situations where the price of goods bears no
rational relation to the good itself. B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL
STREET, 29-32 (1985). A more common example of possibly overstated market
pricing is the existence of overvalued stock prices for companies as evidenced by
excessive price-earnings ratios (i.e., when the earnings of the company are un-
able to justify the market price). But cf. 880 F.2d at 478 (danger of overstated
26
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sources.1 26 Fourth, the problem of market extinction exists when
the use of market values provides a free market incentive to de-
stroy endangered species. 12 7 Finally, government ownership of
natural resources may distort free market values since user fees
charged by governments may be heavily subsidized to encourage
use of natural parks and other resources.1 28
C. Behavioral Use Valuation
Behavioral use valuation is a natural resource damage assess-
ment method that attempts to measure damages on the demand
side of the economic equation. 129 The most common method of
estimating demand is the use of travel cost studies of human con-
sumptive behavior patterns.'30 Travel cost studies operate on the
assumption that visitors to natural sites value resources at the cost
of the expense incurred to travel to sites plus opportunity cost.' 3 '
damages from contingent valuation methodology can be reduced by more so-
phisticated questioning).
Understated damages are more common, however, as exemplified by cases
of open-access resources whose value is not reflected in market prices for the
resources. See, e.g., Congressmen, Environmentalists Protest Rule Setting Value of Re-
source Damage From Spills, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 485 (June 30, 1989) (sixty-two
congressmen and leaders of 12 national environmental groups protest unsatis-
factory natural resource damage estimates based on market "use" values in con-
nection with Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound). For a discussion of the
interplay of market value and open-access value, see supra notes 63-74 and ac-
companying text.
126. Cross, supra note 10, at 309.
127. See supra, note 90, and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 81, and accompanying text.
129. See generally, Cross, supra note 10, at 309-15. Behavioral use valuation
should be compared with restoration and replacement cost and market valuation
methods which measure the supply side of natural resources. For a general dis-
cussion of use values, see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
130. See Cross, supra note 10, at 310. Travel cost studies are not the only
method of behavioral use valuation. See, e.g., D. GIBBONS, THE ECONOMIC VALUE
OF WATER, 66 (1986) (comparing travel cost studies with consumer surveys for
valuing water resources).
Hedonic price valuation attempts to relate the value of non-marketed com-
modities such as air and water to the value of marketed commodities such as
property values. Cross, supra note 10, at 313. In other words, the value of a
natural resource may be measured indirectly through the effect of the hazardous
substance release on property values. Id. The difficulty with hedonic price valu-
ation is that very few natural resources necessarily impact, even indirectly, inde-
pendently marketed commodities such as property values so as to reflect the
value of the damaged resource itself. Id.
131. Note, supra note 19, at 214. Consider the effect of subsidization of user
fees at natural resource sites on the behavioral use values obtained from travel
cost studies. When user fees are partially or fully subsidized by the government
the resulting behavioral use values (measuring actual human spending behavior)
derived from travel cost studies do not reflect the total costs associated with use
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The major advantage of travel cost studies is reliability because
verifiable human behavior serves as the basis for assessment
figures. '3 2
Disadvantages of travel cost studies and other behavioral use
valuation methods must also be presented to understand the limi-
tations of this approach. First, travel time and opportunity costs
are difficult to quantify.13 3 Second, travel cost studies may not be
sensitive enough to reflect relatively small changes in the availa-
bility of natural resources. 3 4 Third, some resources are not con-
tained in national and state parks and thus are inappropriate for
travel cost estimates.' 35 Finally, this approach ignores existence
and intrinsic values that may be associated with natural
resources. 
3 6
D. Contingent Valuation
The most common form of contingent valuation methods is
the use of public response surveys in which people are questioned
about the values they place on various natural resources.' 3 7 One
of the resource. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the
travel cost study methodology, see Cross, supra note 10, at 310-15.
132. See Cross, supra note 10, at 310. Another advantage of travel cost stud-
ies is that this assessment methodology is considered fairly accurate at roughly
approximating use values. Id. at 313. For a discussion of the reliability of use
values, see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
133. See Cross, supra note 10, at 311-12. Factors such as the relative accessi-
bility of the resources and the wage rate or in-come-generating ability of the user
will affect the resource value as determined by the travel cost study. Id. For a
discussion of the effect of government subsidization of user fees, see supra note
131.
134. Cross, supra note 10, at 311. Consider that the destruction of an iso-
lated section of forest area may have negligible impact on the general availability
of forest land for potential park visitors in terms of impacting decisions to use or
not to use the resource. In economic terms, the concept of elasticity correlates
the change in the demand for a good with a change in the supply of the good,
and vice versa. Unfortunately, travel and opportunity costs may not reflect any
change in the availability of the resource despite the very real damage incurred
due to the relative inelasticity of travel costs to resource availability.
135. This is especially true in cases of hazardous substance release or oil
spill where the environmental damage affects areas under government control
which are not the object of tourist travel. The most obvious example is the inci-
dence of oil spills in the open ocean, although beaches may eventually be
affected.
136. Cross, supra note 10, at 313. For a discussion of the open-access val-
ues that underlie non-economic existence and intrinsic values, see supra notes
66-68 and accompanying text.
137. Cross, supra note 10, at 315. Essentially, contingent valuation surveys
take the form of posing hypothetical situations to respondents in which they are
asked to put dollar values on various natural resources. Id. Several approaches
are used in contingent valuation, including direct questioning, bidding formats,
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of the advantages of contingent valuation is its convenience as a
technique for direct measurement of internal consistency and
replicability which roughly correlates with actual market transac-
tions.'3 8 Contingent valuation has been found to be roughly con-
sistent with behavioral use methods as a damage assessment
measurement technique. a39 Of the various methods discussed so
far, only contingent valuation measures existence values.' 40
Unfortunately, contingent valuation is considered a contro-
versial assessment method because of the hypothetical nature of
the data analyzed. 14' A number of problems have been raised
concerning contingent valuation such as the possibility of skewed
responses, the fact that attitudes may not correlate with behav-
iors, and a concern that respondents may be making decisions
based on insufficient information.' 42 Another argument asserts
that contingent valuation violates the common law prohibition of
speculative damages. 143
V. ECONOMICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
CONCERNS
A. Economic Incentives and Polluter Decision-Making
Although not directly addressed by the statutory language of
and a "take or leave it" decisional format. 880 F.2d at 475; see also, 43 C.F.R.
§ 11.83(d)(5)(i) (1989) (contingent valuation "includes all techniques that set up
hypothetical markets to elicit individual's economic valuation of a natural re-
source"). In this way, an approximation is made of the actual value of damaged
natural resources.
138. Cross, supra note 10, at 317.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 320. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(i) (contingent valuation can ex-
plicitly determine existence values). For a discussion of existence values, see
supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
141. Cross, supra note 10, at 315. Essentially, critics of contingent valuation
techniques question the reliability and objectivity of this methodology.
142. See Cross, supra note 10, at 315-17. Basically, these objections criticize
the necessarily subjective nature of contingent valuation judgments made by re-
spondents to the surveys. Of particular interest is the observed variance of an-
swers depending on whether respondents were asked to ascribe values to their
willingness to buy or their willingness to sell certain natural resources. Id. at
318. This raises a potential problem regarding the accuracy of the derived val-
ues of particular natural resources where those values are a function of whether
the respondent is evaluating the hypothetical transaction from the viewpoint of a
buyer or a seller.
143. See, e.g., Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 476
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (industry petitioners argued unsuccessfully that contingent val-
uation methods violated common law proscription of speculative damages). For
a discussion of the D.C. Circuit's treatment of contingent valuation,-see infra
notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
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the natural resource damage provisions of Superfund, economic
considerations may influence environmental policy with respect
to the amounts responsible parties may be required to pay for
damaged resources.' 44 Simply stated, this means that some sort
of economic incentive should be built into the liability provisions
in order to promote firm behavior which seeks to decrease the
probability of accidents occurring. 145 The use of economic incen-
tives attacks the pollution problem from a different angle than the
traditional approach of command-and-control regulations. 146
144. For a thorough discussion of optimal policy concerns in the context of
oil spill liability, see Cohen, supra note 18. Cohen's article attempts to provide a
convenient framework for understanding in simple form some of the competing
factors that influence decision-making on the part of potential polluters. See also,
Grigalunas and Opaluch, supra note 18; Carson and Navarro, Fundamental Issues
in Natural Resource Damage Assessment, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 815 (1988). As an
example of an alternative approach, note that it has been suggested that the
availability of Superfund monies should be expanded to include reduction of any
environmental health risks, not just oil spills and hazardous waste releases.
Portney, Reforming Environmental Regulation: Three Modest Proposals, 13 COLUM. J.
ENvTL. L. 201, 211 (1988) (expansion of scope of Superfind appropriate due to
EPA's view of relatively low risk of Superfund sites).
145. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 34; Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks
Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988) (arguing that eco-
nomic incentives represent more effective method of achieving environmental
safety than traditional forms of government regulation); see also, Ackerman and
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988) (calling for reform of existing environmental
regulations to incorporate market incentives to encourage firm compliance with
environmental standards). The emerging emphasis on incorporation of eco-
nomic incentives into environmental policy and regulation is reflected by the
Project 88 report to the President. Stavins, Harnessing Market Forces to Protect the
Environment, 31 ENV'T 5 (1989) (discussion of interdisciplinary report to Presi-
dent urging increased use of economic incentives in combatting current high-
profile environmental problems).
146. See C.W. MORSE, supra note 95, at 97-107 (discussing alternatives to
command-and-control regulations such as pollution pricing, offset trading, me-
diation, and policy dialogues); Grigalunas and Opaluch, supra note 18, at 509-10
(contrasting use of economic incentives with command-and-control regula-
tions). See also, F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977) (advo-
cating use of economic charges for pollution externalities). Cf. Shavell, Liability
for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984) (comparing tort
liability and safety regulation methods of controlling activities that create risks of
harm to others).
Drawbacks of command-and-control regulations include excessive bureau-
cratic centralization, rigidity, costs, litigation, and delays. Stewart, supra note
145, at 153. Advantages of economic incentives over command-and-control reg-
ulations include large cost savings, freeing up government administrators for
other tasks, encouraging flexibility in control technologies, not penalizing new
products and plants, ongoing R&D incentives for improved safety, enhancing
democratic accountability of environmental policy decisions, and increased gov-
ernment revenues. Id at 159-60. Obstacles to the increased use of economic
incentives include the predominant role of lawyers in society, the moral predi-
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The economists' approach attempts to internalize an external cost
to the firm, i.e., to charge the polluting firm for the external dam-
age to the environment.,4 7
B. Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis
Firms often engage in some form of cost-benefit analysis in
order to determine the appropriate actions and policies in the ab-
sence of explicit legislation or agency regulations forcing them to
take precautionary measures to avoid negative social conse-
quences.148 In economic terms, this means that the marginal cost
of compliance with safety standards which reduce hazardous sub-
stance releases must be less than the marginal cost of liability ex-
posure for failing to adhere to standards of hazardous substance
release prevention.149
lection for prohibition, the depreciation of environmental integrity, claims of
favoring the wealthy, and various political consequences. Id. at 162-64.
147. Grigalunas and Opaluch, supra note 18, at 509-10. In this way the nat-
ural resource damage provisions of CERCLA create a virtual Pigouvian tax on
hazardous substance releases by assessing liability for natural resource damages
to the parties responsible for the injury. Id. at 512.
The Department of Interior regulations attempt to eliminate or control the
external effects or "externalities" of polluting parties through the statutory
sanctions of Superfund. See CERCLA § 107(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (providing
for determination of liability amounts ranging up to complete cleanup and envi-
ronmental damage costs in case of willful misconduct/negligence and possible
treble punitive damages for failure to take appropriate remedial action). "[Mhe
decision to control or eliminate specific externalities will rest on the relative val-
ues of the costs produced by the externalities and the benefits of eliminating
them." C.W. MORSE, supra note 95, at 45. Note that although economic incen-
tives may not be appropriate in all pollution situations, market incentives work
most effectively in reducing overall hazardous risks or pollution levels. Stewart,
supra note 145, at 161.
148. The Cohen article analyzes the problem of formulating effective regu-
latory standards and penalties for oil spill liability through analogizing the inter-
relation of government and the private sector to a principal-agent model with
moral hazard considerations. Cohen, supra note 18, at 25. The use of the princi-
pal-agent model is an attempt to analyze government regulatory agency efforts
to modify the behavior of stochastically polluting firms (i.e., firms polluting
through random discharge occurrences as opposed to continuous discharge).
Id. The moral hazard considerations relate to the fact that pollution can be
avoided by firms through the application of costly although unobtrusive safety
precautions which reduce the likelihood or extent of a pollution incident. Id.
The Cohen article also discusses the Coast Guard's oil spill prevention program,
cited as a real-world example of a stochastic pollution situation. Id. at 34-45.
149. See Note, Oil Spills and Cleanup Bills: Federal Recovery of Oil Spill Cleanup
Costs, 93 HAuv. L. Rv. 1761, 1784 (1980). Marginal cost analysis measures the
incremental effect of various economic changes on the firm's costs. Essentially,
if the marginal (or additional) cost of instituting appropriate safety measures is
less than the marginal (increased expected) cost of liability for pollution (taking
into account relative probabilities, expected values, and risk preferences), then
the rational firm should seek to maximize economic benefit and reduce eco-
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C. Optimal Enforcement Policy and Systems Theory
Systems theory may have some relevance to formulation of
an optimal enforcement policy since the regulatory environment
exhibits dynamics associated with systems.' 50 Since the policy of
Superfund attempts to encourage and enforce efforts to preserve
natural resources on the part of potentially responsible parties,
optimal enforcement policy concerns might help to further the
statutory goals.
VI. SUPERFUND AND THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
REGULATIONS
CERCLA mandates the promulgation of regulations gov-
erning the assessment of natural resource damages under section
301(c).' 5 ' Superfund explicitly requires the formulation of two
distinct types of regulations: Type A "standard procedures for
simplified assessments"' i5 2 and Type B "alternative protocols for
... individual cases."15 3 Despite some delay in the promulgation
nomic cost by adopting and implementing the requisite safety measures. See Co-
hen, supra note 18, at 26. Factors affecting marginal costs in the framework of
natural resource damage assessments will include the perceived likelihood of the
imposition of liability, the extent of damage assessments, and the possibilities
for settlement with the Department of Interior for damages caused by oil spills.
See CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (providing for setdement procedures for
hazardous substance releases).
150. Herbert Simon has helped to make systems theory comprehensible to
the layman, noting the following:
[Systems theory] is a set of attitudes and a frame of mind rather than a
definite and explicit theory. At its vaguest, it means looking at the
whole problem .... hardly a novel idea, and not always a very helpful
one. Somewhat more concretely, it means designing the components
of a system and making individual decisions within it in the light of the
implication of these decisions for the system as a whole.
H. SIMON, THE NEW SCIENCE OF MANAGEMENT DECISION, 15 (1960).
For a discussion of a formulation of an environmental compliance system
incorporating both open and closed systems theory, seeJ.F. DIMENTO, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND AMERICAN BUSINESS: DILEMMAS OF COMPLIANCE, 67-71 (1986).
Cf. C. RUSSELL, W. HARRINGTON & W. VAUGHAN, ENFORCING POLLUTION CON-
TROL LAWS 105-21 (1986) (delineating a simple and complex model of a volun-
tary compliance system for stochastic ("random") discharges).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c). Section 301(c) states in pertinent part: "The
President . .. shall promulgate regulations for the assessment of damages for
injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources resulting from a release of
oil or a hazardous substance .. " Id.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2). For the complete text of section 301(c)(2)(A),
see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (c)(2)(B). Section 301(c)(2)(B) of CERCLA also pro-
vides "[sluch regulations shall identify the best available procedures to deter-
mine such damages, including both direct and indirect injury, destruction, or
loss and shall take into consideration factors including, but not limited to, re-
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of the Department of Interior regulations, 154 authorized officials
are now empowered to assess natural resource damages in the
capacity of trustees of natural resources under section
107(f)(2)(A) 155 of CERCLA and section 311(0(4) and (5) of the
Clean Water Act.156
There has been wide disagreement between the Department
of Interior and the states concerning whether restoration costs
represent a floor or ceiling on damages or are appropriate only
when restoration cost assessment results in a figure less than that
obtained from market valuation methods.157 Essentially, this is a
conflict between economic and ecological losses. The economic
position is that a societal cost-benefit analysis indicates that im-
posing liability on responsible parties at a cost greater than the
actual market value of the resources is overly burdensome. 158
The ecological position contends that restoration costs are fa-
vored by the strong policy of CERCLA and the Clean Water Act
placement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover."
Id.
154. See 880 F.2d at 440.
155. CERCLA § 107(f)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A). This section pro-
vides as follows:
Such officials shall assess damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss
of natural resources for purposes of this chapter and such section 1321
of Title 33 for those resources under their trusteeship and may, upon
request of and reimbursement from a State and at the Federal officials'
discretion, assess damages for those natural resources under the State's
trusteeship.
Id.
156. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4) & (5).
157. See, e.g., Ohio v. United States Dep't. of Interior, 880 F.2d at 441. For
arguments supporting the use of restoration and replacement costs regardless of
a comparison to market valuation figures, see Cross, supra note 10, at 327-34.
But see, Note, supra note 19, at 219-225.
158. See, Note, supra note 19, at 219-25. The economic position argues that
natural resource damage assessments should be primarily concerned with
achieving fairness and efficiency through standardization of assessment method-
ologies. Id. at 220. For an example of a case assessing natural resource dam-
ages at the lesser of restoration or replacement costs or diminution of use
values, see, e.g., Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 676 (D. Idaho 1986)
(holding that appropriate measure of damages to natural resources is lesser of
value-based or cost-of-restoration basis). But cf. Denoyer v. Lamb, 22 Ohio App.
3d 136, 138, 490 N.E.2d 615, 618 (1984) (holding reasonable restoration costs
were appropriate measure for property damages to private recreational or resi-
dential resources, so long as expenditures are not grossly disproportionate to
diminution in market value); Heninger v. Dunn, 101 Cal. App. 3d 858, 865-66,
162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (1980) (allowing restoration costs for damage to trees
and vegetation based on owners' personal reasons for wanting to restore prop-
erty, so long as not unreasonable compared to damage inflicted and diminution
in market value).
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for preservation of natural resources. 159
The Department of Interior regulations primarily focus on
use value and consider market value when measurable. The regu-
lations rarely consider option and existence values or contingent
valuation and favor restoration costs only when their use yields a
lower natural resource damage estimate of lost use value than
market value measurement techniques. i '
The statutory language of Superfund and the Clean Water
Act provides support for both interpretations (economic and eco-
logical) regarding treatment of restoration costs, although there
is no indication of limiting damages to market value economic
losses. '61 Examination of the legislative history of Superfund also
reveals some support for both the economic and ecological
positions. 162
Section 107(0(1) of CERCLA states that amounts recovered
by states and the federal government are collected "for use only
to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such (damaged)
natural resources."' 6 3 This appears to support the ecological
view favoring restoration costs although opponents argue that the
language merely describes the use to which funds will be put, not
the method of determining the amount of damages.' 4 Further
statutory language in section 107(0(1) favoring restoration costs
states that damage measures "shall not be limited by the sums which
can be used to restore or replace such resources." 165 Section
159. See Cross, supra note 10, at 327. Perhaps the strongest evidence of the
congressional intent to favor preservation of natural resources through use of
restoration and replacement costs can be found in the language of Superfund
itself. Section 107(0(1) provides "damages ... shall not be limited by the sums
which can be used to restore or replace such resources." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1)
(emphasis added).
160. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(ii) (1989) (providing that "use of contingent
valuation methodology to explicitly estimate option and existence values should
be used only if the authorized official determines that no use values can be
determined").
161. See Cross, supra note 10, at 327-34; but see Note, supra note 19, at 218-
222.
162. Cf Cross, supra note 10, at 325 (citing legislative support for use of
restoration damages) with Note, supra note 19, at 218-19 (citing legislative sup-
port for limiting natural resource damage recoveries). See also Breen, supra note
100, at 10307-09.
163. CERCIA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1).
164. 880 F.2d at 447 (industry parties unsuccessfully argued that "shall not
be limited by" language merely prescribed the uses to which recovered natural
resource damages must be put); Cf. Note, supra note 19, at 220.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (emphasis added). This language, "shall not be
limited to" has been construed as implicitly favoring the use of restoration costs
in most instances. 880 F.2d at 445-46.
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301(c)(2) contains language relating to natural resource damage
assessment regulations calling for "the best available procedures
to determine such damages, including both direct and indirect in-
jury, destruction, or loss and shall take into consideration factors in-
cluding, but not limited to, replacement value, use value, and
ability of the ecosystem or resources to recover."'Ir
In the interim period after the passage of Superfund and
before the promulgation of the Department of Interior regula-
tions, several federal courts examined issues in connection with
liability for natural resource damages. 67 For example, prior to
the enactment of CERCLA, the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit decided a case dealing with an oil spill from a tanker off the
coastline of Puerto Rico.168 The court of appeals held, inter alia,
that damages were not limited to the diminution of market value
of affected property. 69
VII. APPROACH OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS
Two consolidated cases, both decided on July 14, 1989, rec-
ognized the inadequacy of the existing Department of Interior
regulations relating to oil spill damage and hazardous substance
release liability.' 7 0 Interested parties in the two cases included
the Department of Interior, state and environmental groups, and
industry intervenors.' 7' Both cases favored the ecological ap-
166. CERCLA § 301(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2).
167. E.g., United States v. Cumberland Farms of Connecticut, Inc., 826
F.2d 1151, 1164 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding restoration order for wildlife habitat
following dredging and filling of freshwater wetland by Army Corps. of Engi-
neers); United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 1983)
(upholding restoration plan as remedy for federal violations of Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act and Clean Water Act); United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) (court was willing to inter-
pret natural resource damages provisions despite fact that regulations had not
yet been promulgated); United States v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. Keys Comm.
College, 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (finding that replacement costs for
alternate site mitigation were appropriate natural resource damage measure). Cf.
United States v. Moretti, 526 F.2d 1307, 1310 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding order
of restoration of topography damaged by dredging of canals).
168. Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980).
169. Id. at 675-76.
170. Colorado v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 481 (1st Cir.
1989); Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (1st Cir. 1989). For
a brief summary of these cases, see D.C. Circuit Remands Interior Regulations, Says
They Undervalue Natural Resource Losses, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 558 (July 21, 1989).
The Department of Interior's Natural Resource Damage Assessment regulations
can be found at 43 C.F.R. § 11.10-.93 (1988).
171. Colorado v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 482 (1st
1990] 525
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proach involving consideration of restoration and replacement
costs over the economic approach of the Department of Interior's
interpretation of the CERCLA natural resource damage
provisions. 172
A. COLORADO V. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF INTERIOR
In Colorado v. United States Dep't of Interior,'t s state and envi-
ronmental groups sought judicial review of the Department of In-
terior's Type A natural resource damage assessment
regulations.1 74 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Department of Interior reasonably limited the scope of the Type
A regulations to minor spills in coastal and marine environ-
ments. 175 The court of appeals remanded the case to allow the
Department of Interior to bring the regulations into compliance
with the guidelines set forth by the same court in Ohio v. United
States Dep't of Interior,176 taking into consideration replacement
value as well as lost use value.' 77
The Department of Interior's Type A assessment rules re-
quire the use of a computer model termed the Natural Resource
Damage Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine Environments
(NRDAM/CME). 178 The NRDAM/CME computer model con-
tains three integrated submodels to make the necessary calcula-
Cir. 1989) (state of Colorado and three environmental groups sought review of
natural resource damage assessment regulations relating to Type A simplified
assessments); Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 438 (1st
Cir. 1989) (Ten states, three environmental groups, chemical industry trade as-
sociation, manufacturing company, and public utility company sought review of
natural resource damage regulations relating to Type B assessments for major
spills of hazardous substances and oil).
172. Colorado v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 491 (re-
manding Department of Interior's Type A regulations to incorporate standards
set forth in Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior regarding use of restoration costs
as damage measure); 880 F.2d at 457 (emphasizing primacy of restoration of
natural resources as reflecting values beyond use or market values).
173. 880 F.2d 481 (1st Cir. 1989).
174. Id. at 482.
175. Id. at 489.
176. 880 F.2d 432 (1st Cir. 1989).
177. Colorado v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d at 491.
178. Id. at 484. Summary treatment of the NRDAM/CME can be found at
43 C.F.R. § 11.41(a)(l) (1989). For an example of the application of the
NRDAM/CME, see Cross, supra note 10, at 325-26. See also Grigalunas and
Opaluch, supra note 18, at 518-28.
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tions: a "physical fates"'179 submodel, a "biological effects"' 80
submodel, and an "economic damages"'' submodel. The
NRDAM/CME assessment methodology goes through four
phases, similar to those of the Type B assessments: (1) assess-
ment plan, (2) injury determination, (3) quantification, and (4)
damage determination.18 2
B. OHIO V. UNITED STATES DEP'T. OF INTERIOR
The companion case to Colorado v. United States Dep't of Inte-
rior 18 3 involved ten states, three environmental groups, a chemi-
cal industry trade association, a manufacturing firm, and a public
utility company challenging the Department of Interior's natural
resource damage assessment regulations promulgated pursuant
to CERCLA section 301(c)(1)-(3). 8 4 Essentially, the case focused
on two separate conflicting views concerning the natural resource
damage regulations: (1) the allegations of the state and environ-
mental parties that the Department of Interior's regulations un-
derstated damages to natural resources due to hazardous
materials spills and (2) the industry arguments that overstated
damages would result from the assessment rules.'8 5
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Department
of Interior's Type B regulations limiting government recovery of
natural resource damages to the "lesser of" restoration cost or
lost use value were directly contrary to legislative intent and
179. The "physical fates" submodel determines the pathway of the contam-
ination during the injury determination phase of the NRDAM/CME model. 880
F.2d at 484. For a discussion of the "physical fates" submodel, see Grigalunas
and Opaluch, supra note 18, at 518-20.
180. Determination of the extent of the injury to the natural resources takes
place within the "biological effects" submodel. 880 F.2d at 484. For an analysis
of the "biological effects" submodel, see Grigalunas and Opaluch, supra note 18,
at 520-22.
181. The "economic damages" submodel incorporates the data from the
other submodels to calculate the monetary value of the economic harm to the
damaged coastal and marine environment. 880 F.2d at 484. For a discussion of
the "economic damages" submodel, see Grigalunas and Opaluch, supra note 18,
at 522-25.
182. 880 F.2d at 484. Cf Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d
432 at 440 (Type B regulations broken into four phases: "preassessment
phase," "assessment plan phase," "assessment phase," and "post-assessment
phase").
183. 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
184. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 at 438. For the statu-
tory language of Section 301 (c)(1)-(3) of Superfund governing natural resource
damage assessments, see supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
185. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d at 438.
1990] 527
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therefore invalid.186 The court of appeals further held that the
Type B regulations' hierarchy of methodologies for measuring
lost use value focusing exclusively on market values was not a rea-
sonable statutory interpretation and therefore was disallowed. 8 7
Finally, the case was remanded to the Department of Interior for
clarification of Type A and Type B regulations enforcing the
CERCLA natural resource damage provisions as applied to pri-
vately owned land.' 88
1. Standard of Review
The standard of review for a federal agency's interpretation
of a statutory provision follows the two-step analysis set forth by
the Supreme Court in Chevron United States Am. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc..189 The analysis involves an initial de-
termination of "whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue."' 90 In the event that Congress has
clearly expressed its intent on a specific issue, the courts must
give effect to the intended Congressional interpretation.19'
When Congress is silent on a given issue or its intent is ambigu-
ous, the courts are obliged to give deference to the agency's rea-
sonable interpretation of the statute in question. 9
2
2. The "Lesser Of" Rule
The major issue in Ohio v. United States Dep' of Interior con-
cerned the "lesser of" rule which provided that the appropriate
damages measure for natural resources should be "the lesser of:
restoration or replacement costs; or diminution of use values."' 93
The various state and environmental parties argued successfully
186. Id. at 442. For a discussion of the court of appeals' reasoning concern-
ing the "lesser of" rule, see infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
187. Id. at 464. For a discussion of the court's analysis of the hierarchy of
assessment methods, see infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
188. Id. at 461. For a discussion of the public ownership rule, see infra
notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
189. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
190. Id. at 842.
191. Id. at 842-43.
192. Id. at 844-45.
193. 880 F.2d at 441. The Department of Interior regulations at
§ 11.35(b)(2) & (3) state the following:
(2) The authorized official shall select the leser of. restoration or
replacement costs; or diminution of use values as the measure of dam-
ages, except as specified in paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
(3) When restoration or replacement of the injured resource is not
technically feasible, as that phrase is used in this part, the diminution in
use values, as determined by using the methodologies listed in § 11.83
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that the "lesser of" rule would often result in damage assess-
ments insufficient to cover restoration, replacement, or acquisi-
tion of the equivalent of the damaged resources and that the
purpose of CERCLA was to provide for restoration of damaged
natural resources where possible. 94
In examining the Department of Interior regulations in light
of the statutory language of CERCLA and the legislative history
of CERCLA and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986 (SARA), 1 9 5 the D.C. Circuit concluded that Con-
gress had clearly expressed a distinct preference for measuring
damages by restoration cost and that the "lesser of" rule was
therefore an impermissible interpretation of Congress' unambig-
uous intent.' 96 Perhaps the strongest supporting language in
CERCLA is contained in section 107(0(1), stating that the mea-
sure& of damages "shall not be limited by" restoration costs. 197
The court of appeals understood the CERCLA natural resource
damage assessment provisions to reflect a strong policy concern
favoring preservation of natural resources which took precedence
over traditional cost-benefit analysis. 198
3. The Public Ownership Rule
The state and environmental groups in Ohio v. United States
Dep 't of Interior raised a number of other issues concerning the De-
partment of Interior's damage assessment regulations. 99 Peti-
tioners challenged the public ownership rule which limited the
availability of natural resource damages to cases where the re-
sources were owned by governmental entities, rather than by pri-
vate parties.200 The court of appeals upheld the public ownership
of this part, or other methodologies that meet the acceptance criteria in
§ 11.83 of this part, shall constitute the measure of damages.
43 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2) & (3) (1989) (emphasis added).
194. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d at 441.
195. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611.
196. 880 F.2d at 444.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). In pertinent part, section 107(f(1) states
"[t]he measure of damages in any action under subparagraph (C) of subsection
(a) of this section shall not be limited by the sums which can be used to restore or
replace such resources." Id. (emphasis added).
198. 880 F.2d at 457.
199. See infra notes 200-26 and accompanying text.
200. 880 F.2d at 459. Section 107 of Superfund can be interpreted to limit
recovery of natural resources damages to government lands. 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
The statute defines "natural resources" as "resources belonging to, managed
by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States
.... any State or local government, any foreign government, any Indian tribe, or
• .. any member of any Indian tribe." Id. § 101(16), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16).
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rule after examining the statutory language of CERCLA and the
surrounding legislative history, but remanded the record to the
Department of Interior for clarification of its interpretation of its
own regulations concerning the extent to which coverage might
be available for resources not owned by the government. 20'
4. The "Committed Use" Requirement
The state and environmental groups objected to the "com-
mitted use" requirement limiting the measurement of use values
for the damaged resources. 20 2 The D.C. Circuit upheld the
"committed use" standard because of the reasonableness of
avoiding highly speculative use estimates. 203 The court of ap-
peals justified the limitation on use estimates because of the pos-
sibility of restoration or replacement cost estimates serving as the
damage measure, regardless of a showing of a "committed
use."2o4
5. The Hierarchy of Assessment Methods
The environmental organizations had somewhat more suc-
cess in challenging the hierarchy of assessment methods which
limited use valuation to market values in the absence of a finding
that the "market for the resource is not reasonably competi-
tive." 20 5 The court of appeals recognized the inability of market
201. 880 F.2d at 461.
202. 43 C.F.R. § 11.84(b)(2) (1989). The Department of Interior's regula-
tions provided that "[o]nly committed uses.., of the resources or services over
the recovery period will be used to measure the change from the baseline result-
ing from injury to a resource." 43 C.F.R. § 11.84(b)(2) (1989). The Depart-
ment of Interior defined "committed uses" in the regulations as "either: a
current public use; or a planned public use of a natural resource for which there
is a documented legal, administrative, budgetary, or financial commitment es-
tablished before the discharge of oil or release of a hazardous substance is de-
tected." 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(h) (1989).
203. 880 F.2d at 462. This justification for the "committed use" require-
ment can be found in the regulations, which state, "[t]he baseline uses must be
reasonably probable, not just in the realm of possibility. Purely speculative uses
of the injured resource are precluded from consideration in the estimation of
damages." 43 C.F.R. § 11.84(b)(2).
204. 880 F.2d at 462.
205. 880 F.2d at 462 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1)). The Department of
Interior regulations provided the following:
(c)(2) When the authorized official determines that the market
price methodology is not appropriate, the appraisal methodology shall
be used if sufficient information exists.
(d)(1) Only when the authorized official has determined that
neither the market price nor the appraisal methodology is appropriate
shall the methodologies listed in this section or those that meet the
40
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prices to capture open-access values of natural resources: "From
the bald eagle to the blue whale and snail darter, natural re-
sources have values that are not fully captured by the market sys-
tem." 20 6 The D.C. Circuit applied Step Two of the Chevron
analysis in concluding that the Department of Interior regulations
which overemphasized market value represented an unreasonable
statutory interpretation. 207 The court of appeals noted the neces-
sity of considering option and existence values which are not ade-
quately reflected in market prices for resources. 20
6. Ten Percent Discount Rate
The next challenge brought by the state and environmental
parties concerned the use by the Department of Interior of a ten
percent discount rate for calculating the present value of ex-
pected future injury to resources. 20 9 The court of appeals dis-
missed arguments that the use of present value analysis would
systematically undervalue natural resource damages.210
7. Allegedly Preferential Treatment of PRPs
State and environmental parties alleged that the Department
of Interior regulations provided preferential treatment for "po-
tentially responsible parties (PRPs)." 21' The contested issues
acceptance criteria in paragraph (d)(7) of this section be used to esti-
mate a diminution of use value for the purposes of this part.
43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(2) & (d)(1) (1989).
Subsections (d)(2)-(7) provided for other valuation methodologies such as
travel cost studies (see supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text) and contin-
gent valuation (seesupra notes 137-43 and accompanying text). Id. § 11.83(d)(2)-
(7) (1989).
206. 880 F.2d at 462-63. For a discussion of open-access values, see supra
notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
207. Id. at 462.
208. Id. at 464. For a discussion of option and existence values, see supra
notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
209. Id. at 464-65. The Department of Interior regulations stated that
"[w]here possible, damages should be estimated in the form of an expected
present value dollar amount. In order to perform this calculation, a discount
rate (specified by the Office of Management and Budget) must be selected." 43
C.F.R. § 11.84(e)(1) & (2) (1989).
210. 880 F.2d at 465. Present value calculation is a tool of financial analysis
which determines the necessary amount of money received today that would be
equivalent to some future amount or stream of payments. The difference re-
flects the estimated returns on interim investments. Essentially, the court of ap-
peals reasoned that if estimation of the projected future costs of restoring the
resources was reasonably accurate, then a discounted present value figure
should not undervalue the resource to be restored. Id.
211. Id. at 465. "Potentially responsible parties" are parties who may be
responsible for hazardous substance releases or oil spills and therefore may be
1990]
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concerned the authorization for and delegation of assessment
tasks to PRPs and the public notice and comment provisions. 21 2
The court of appeals refused to find that participation of PRPs in
the assessment process or the right to public notice and comment
during the preassessment and assessment plan phases was unrea-
sonable or contrary to the intent of CERCLA.213
8. Reasonable Assessment Costs Limitation
The D.C. Circuit declined to overturn the Department of In-
terior's rule limiting recovery of "reasonable costs of assessing"
natural resources to situations where "the anticipated cost of the
assessment is expected to be less than the anticipated damage
amount. '"214 The court of appeals found rational justification for
a regulation designed to avoid the waste of spending more on
determining the amount of damage than on the damage itself.215
9. Acceptance Criteria
The court of appeals upheld the Department of Interior reg-
ulations which established a set of "acceptance criteria" for deter-
mining the necessary element of causation in natural resource
damages due to oil or hazardous substance releases.2 16 The court
liable to pay damages. Id. Although petroleum products are generally excluded
from the list of hazardous substances under Superfund, oil spill releases are cov-
ered under section 311 (b)(2)(A) of the Clean Water Act, explicitly incorporated
by reference into Superfund. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
212. 880 F.2d at 466-68. Basically, the first objection concerned the fact
that some PRPs were involved in the assessment process and thus conceivably
could influence the objectivity of the assessments. Id. at 466. The court of ap-
peals found that the Department of Interior was empowered to delegate assess-
ment tasks to PRPs with the lead authorized official determining the delegated
assessment tasks to be performed "under the direction, guidance, and monitor-
ing of the authorized official." Id. (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 11.32(d)). The second
contention argued that PRPs were permitted notice and comment on the assess-
ment process which was denied to the general public and other government
agencies with an interest in the assessments. Id. at 467.
213. Id. at 467-68.
214. Id. at 468.
215. Id.
216. 880 F.2d at 472-73. The Department of Interior regulations delineate
a set of four acceptance criteria for determining injury to a biological resource:
(i) The biological response is often the result of exposure to oil or
hazardous substances ....
(ii) Exposure to oil or hazardous substances is known to cause this
biological response in free-ranging organisms....
(iii) Exposure to oil or hazardous substances is known to cause this
biological response in controlled experiments....
(iv) The biological response measurement is practical to perform
and produces scientifically valid results.
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of appeals found that statutory ambiguity existed on this issue
and therefore, under step two of the Chevron analysis, deference is
to be given to the Department of Interior's reasonable interpreta-
tion of the statute which permitted adoption of traditional stan-
dards of causation. 21 7
10. Audit Requirements
The court of appeals approved the Department of Interior's
promulgation of audit requirements for accounting and planning
purposes as within their statutory rulemaking authority under sec-
tion 301(c) of CERCLA. 218 The audit requirements were found
to be reasonably related to the assessment of natural resource
damages and consistent with the goals of Superfund in ensuring
statutory compliance. 219
11. Punitive Damages
The state and environmental groups unsuccessfully argued
that the Department of Interior regulations should have provided
for punitive damages against responsible parties. 220 The court of
appeals interpreted the "best available procedures" language re-
lating to the determination of compensatory damages to indicate
the statutory intent to eliminate the possibility of punitive
damages. 221
12. Contingent Valuation
The final set of issues examined by the D.C. Circuit con-
cerned the use of contingent valuation techniques in assessing
natural resource damages. 222 The court of appeals disagreed
with arguments of the industry parties attempting to undercut the
43 C.F.R. § 11.62(O(2)(i)-(iv) (1989).
217. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d at 473. For a discus-
sion of the Chevron standard of review analysis, see supra notes 189-92 and ac-
companying text.
218. 880 F.2d at 474. For the text of Section 301(c) of CERCLA containing
the statutory authority to promulgate regulations, see supra note 151.
219. 880 F.2d at 474.
220. Id.
221. Id. The court of appeals reasoned that if Congress had intended puni-
tive damages to be made available, there would have been no need for
Superfund to require such precise determination of compensatory damages by
the "best available procedures", since recovery would not be limited to compen-
satory damages. CERCLA § 301(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2).
222. 880 F.2d at 474-81.
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legitimacy of contingent valuation methods. 223 After reviewing
the Department of Interior's investigations of contingent valua-
tion methods, the court of appeals found that these methodolo-
gies were consistent with the statutory requirement to use the
"best available procedures.- 224 The industry parties in Ohio v.
United States Dep't of Interior unsuccessfully challenged the exten-
sion of the rebuttable presumption of validity to encompass con-
tingent valuation assessments as well as restoration cost
assessments. 225 The D.C. Circuit accordingly approved the adop-
tion of contingent valuation methodology in the assessment of
natural resource damages.2 26
VII. CONCLUSION
Examination of the different types of natural resource values
such as use value, existence value, and intrinsic value and of the
relative merits of the various methodologies for evaluating the
worth of natural resources supports the conclusion that the cur-
rent Department of Interior regulations understate true natural
resource damages because of their exclusive dependency on use
value and market valuation. The growing recognition and accept-
ance of ecological concerns may be aided by economic analysis
through firm compliance incentives. The recent decisions of the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals strongly suggest that restoration
costs should be used as the presumptive method of natural re-
source damages. If restoration costs prove to be disproportion-
ately expensive in a given situation or if restoration is impossible
223. Id. at 476. For a general discussion of contingent valuation, see supra
notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
224. Id. at 478. The use of contingent valuation was considered by the De-
partment of Interior in promulgating the natural resource damage assessment
regulations and was discussed in section 11.83(d)(5):
(5)(i) The contingent valuation methodology includes all tech-
niques that set up hypothetical markets to elicit an individual's eco-
nomic valuation of a natural resource. This methodology can
determine use values and explicitly determine option and existence
values.
(ii) The use of the contingent valuation methodology to explicitly
estimate option and existence values should be used only if the author-
ized official determines that no use values can be determined.
43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(i) & (ii) (1989).
225. 880 F.2d at 480. The industry parties in Ohio focused on the possibil-
ity of bias infecting the validity of contingent valuation assessments. Id. at 477.
The court of appeals disagreed with the contention that contingent valuation
could not qualify as a "best available procedure" based on the Department of
Interior's thorough investigation of such assessments and refused to disallow its
use as a damage assessment measure. Id.
226. Id. at 480.
44
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol1/iss2/4
1990] NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS 535
or highly impractical, then other valuation methodologies such as
contingent valuation offer a viable assessment alternative. Policy
considerations in Superfund and related environmental legisla-
tion evidence support for favoring the preservation of natural re-
sources over the concerns of polluters in the fairness analysis.
Michael W. Jones
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